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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

PEARL TOPANOTES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 990708-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal form a third degree felony conviction for possession of heroin, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999). This Court has
jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Where the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress is based on its
erroneous conclusion that no detention occurred here, can the ruling be affirmed on
the alternative ground that discovery of the outstanding warrants leading to
defendant's arrest and search-incident thereto was inevitable?
Because the trial court found no illegality, it did not consider any exceptions to the
exclusionary rule. Therefore, as the trial court did not pass on this alternative, "inevitable
discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule, no standard of review applies.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probably cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. Const. Amend. IV
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of heroin, a third degree felony (R. 7).
Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search of her person
incident to her arrest on outstanding warrants (R. 29). Following an evidentiary hearing,
the trial court denied the motion (R. 98:3-4) (a copy of the oral ruling is contained in the
addendum). Defendant entered a conditional plea and was sentenced to an indeterminate
statutory prison term of zero-to-five years at the Utah State Prison (R. 93-98). Defendant
timely appealed (R. 74).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Several Salt Lake City police officers were patrolling a known "prostitute track"
on North Temple, on 7 October 1998, and arrested prostitute Glenna Thomas (R. 88:713). Salt Lake City police routinely attempt to confirm an arrested prostitute's actual
residence (R. 88:12-13). Accordingly, three officers, including Sgt. Hansen, and Officer
Mitchell, had Thomas take them to the trailer where she claimed to live with a girlfriend

2
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named Pearl, a short native American who she said also worked as prostitute (R. 88:8-9,
20).
Officer Mitchell knocked on the trailer door, but received no response (R. 88:25).
He then talked to the owner of the home on the same property (id). The homeowner
confirmed that a short Native American girl named Pearl lived in the trailer (R. 88:26).
As the officers were leaving the premises, Officer Mitchell saw defendant walk by
and observed that she fit the homeowner's description of the Native American girl that
lived in the trailer (R. 88:27). Sgt. Hansen also saw defendant walking toward the trailer
(R. 88:13). Sgt. Hansen identified himself as a police officer and asked defendant if she
had any identification (R. 88:10). When defendant provided identification, Sgt. Hansen
handed it to Officer Mitchell and asked him to call it in for a warrants check (R. 88:1014). While waiting for the warrants check to be completed, Sgt. Hansen attempted to
confirm with defendant Thomas's identity and residence (R. 88:11). The warrants check
was completed within five minutes and revealed two outstanding warrants for defendant
(R. 88:22). She was arrested and searched incident to the arrest; the search revealed
heroin on her person (id.).
At the suppression hearing, defense counsel elicited that police routinely check for
outstanding warrants under these circumstances (R. 88:16). Although Thomas had
reported living with a prostitute named Pearl, Sgt. Hansen did not "at that moment"
suspect defendant of any criminal activity (id.). Officer Mitchell concurred that while
3
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they had information defendant was also a prostitute, they did not then suspect of her
soliciting (R. 88:28).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State acknowledges that, based on the instant facts, the trial court erred in
determining that no detention occurred when police retained defendant's identification
while running a warrants check. However, the record supports an analytically sound
alternative ground for affirmance: the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary
rule. Indeed, as a warrants check under these circumstances is routine procedure, the
instant check would have been conducted even without the physical retention of
defendant's identification. It was therefore inevitable that police would discover
defendant's outstanding warrants and that she would be arrested thereon. Any contraband
seized during the search incident-to-arrest on the outstanding warrants is accordingly
admissible.
ARGUMENT
THE RULING BELOW SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON THE
ALTERNATIVE GROUND THAT DEFENDANT'S OUTSTANDING
WARRANTS WOULD INEVITABLY HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED
DURING THE WARRANTS CHECK, REGARDLESS OF
WHETHER POLICE FIRST RETURNED OR RETAINED HER
IDENTIFICATION
On appeal, defendant asserts that she was improperly detained when police held
her personal identification during a warrants check performed in the absence of any
reasonable suspicion that she was involved in solicitation or other criminal activity. Aplt.
4
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Br. at 15-27. Defendant's argument has merit. See Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App.
55, fl3 (holding that retention of defendant's identification during a warrants check
amounted to detention requiring Fourth Amendment justification).l
However, as police would have run the warrants check even if they had not
retained defendant's identification, her arrest on outstanding warrants was inevitable, as
was the search incident thereto, revealing heroin on her person. The trial court's ruling
should therefore be affirmed on the alternative ground of inevitable discovery. See Debry
v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,444 (Utah 1995) (affirming on alternative grounds); State v. S. V.,
906 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App. 1995) (same).
A.

Defendant's Identification Was Obtained During a
Voluntary Level One Encounter

The trial court properly ruled that defendant's encounter with police was initially a
level one voluntary encounter which required no Fourth Amendment justification (R.
98:3) (a copy of the trial court's oral ruling is contained in the addendum). Ray, 2000
UT 55,fflf9-12(citing State v. Deitman,739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)). Indeed,
police can lawfully approach a citizen and request identification without triggering Fourth
Amendment protections. Id. at ^[12; State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah App.
1990) (recognizing that as a matter of law a request for identification cannot constitute a
show of authority sufficient to convert an innocent encounter into a seizure), cert, denied,

defendant's brief was filed on 14 February 2000, just 17 days before Ray was
issued on 2 March 2000.
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815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). See also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,434, 439 (1991)
(acknowledging that police can approach individuals without reasonable suspicion and
ask them potentially incriminating questions). Thus, defendant does not dispute that
police lawfully obtained her identification during the initial level one, or voluntary
encounter. Aplt. Br. at 8.
B.

Retention of the Identification Constituted a Level Two
Detention

However, here, the voluntary encounter rose to a level two detention when police
did not immediately return defendant's identification, but retained it while running the
warrants check {see R. 98:7). Ray, 2000 UT 55 at lfl[13-17. A level two detention must
be supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at *fl8. Officers Hansen
and Mitchell made plain that they did not suspect defendant of solicitation or other
criminal behavior when they approached to question her about Thomas, the prostitute
they had just arrested, and whose identity and residence they wrere attempting to verify
(R.88:16, 28). Absent reasonable suspicion that defendant was herself soliciting, or
otherwise involved in criminality, the detention engendered by retaining her identification
during the warrants check was unjustified under Ray. Id. at ^[13-17. The trial court erred
in concluding otherwise. Id.

6
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C.

The Inevitable Discovery Rule Presents a Sound
Alternative Ground for Affirmance

Notwithstanding the illegal detention in this case, the inevitable discovery rule
allows the admission of evidence "if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by
lawful means." Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,444 (1984). Indeed, the inevitable
discovery rule permits
the prosecution to purge the taint of illegally obtained evidence by proving,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that such evidence inevitably would
have been discovered, absent the illegality, by proper and predictable police
investigative procedures.
State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 225, 242 (Ore. 1985), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 141 (1986). See
also United States v. Larsen, 127 F.3d 984, 987 (10th Cir. 1997), cert, denied, 522 U.S.
1140 (1998). Accordingly, the issue in determining "inevitable discovery" is what would
have occurred if the investigation had continued without the illegality. Nix, 467 U.S. at
444 & 459; Larsen, 127 F.3d at 987. The majority of courts follow the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals which requires no absolute proof, beyond evidence of predictable police
routine, of what would have hypothetically occurred absent the illegality.
[T]he inevitable discovery exception applies whenever an independent
investigation inevitably would have led to discovery of the evidence,
whether or not the investigation was ongoing at the time of the illegal police
conduct.

7
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LarsenMl F.3d at 986.2
As elicited below, a warrants check under the instant circumstances is predictable
police routine (R. 88:16, 22, 27). See, e.g., State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah
1987) and State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 985 (Utah App. 1994) (both involving routine
warrants checks, the former during a voluntary encounter, and the latter pursuant to
reasonable suspicion). See also People v. Bo user, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 163, 164 (Cal. App.
1994) (warrants check "standard procedure"), cert, denied, 514 U.S. 1039 (1995); Wilson
v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 217 (Wyo. 1994) ("routine warrants check"); State v. Madrigal,
827 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Wash App. 1992) ("Outstanding warrant checks during valid

2

This Court first recognized inevitable discovery as an exception to the
exclusionary rule in State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1293 (Utah App. 1988); see also
State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916 (Utah App. 1995); Wayne R. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 11.4(a), at 241 (3rd Ed. 1996). Subsequently, in State v. James, this Court
adopted a singular interpretation of the rule, holding for the first time that the prosecution
must prove that an "entirely independent, alternative, intervening, appreciable attenuated
investigation aside from the tainted investigation" was inevitable to successfully invoke
the inevitable discovery exception. 1999 UT App. 17,1J18-20, 977 P.2d 489, cert,
granted, 984 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1999). According to James, the inevitable investigation
may not be a theoretical or substitute lawful investigation but must be a completely
"independent, parallel" investigation. Id. The State acknowledges that it could not
prevail on the instant facts under the inevitable discovery rule as it has been interpreted in
James. However, as noted above, the Utah Supreme Court has granted certiorari to
review the expansive and unworkable new test adopted in James, including its
misinterpretation of the 10th Circuit's opinion in Larsen. James, 984 P.2d at 1023. Oral
argument in James was held on 25 May 2000. Because James is likely determinative
here, the State moved to stay the instant proceedings pending the supreme court's
disposition in James. See contemporaneous Motion to Stay Oral Argument. This Court
denied the motion on 5 May 2000.
8
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criminal investigatory stops are reasonable routine police procedures.'9); State v.
Johnson, 517 N.E.2d 262, 263 (Ohio App. 1986) ("routine warrant check").
As further noted by the trial court, a warrants check can generally be performed
any time on any individual (R. 88:37). See Ray, 2000 UT 55, at % 13 n.2 (recognizing
that if an officer views the defendant's identification, obtains the desired information, and
promptly returns it, "[a] warrant check will not per se escalate the encounter into a level
two stop[:]" Indeed, assuming the defendant is not otherwise detained, "the officer may
run a warrants check or make any other use of the information"); See also State v.
Soukharith, 570 N.W.2d 344, 353 (Neb. 1997) (reasonable suspicion not required to run
a warrants check where suspect was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment). Therefore, having verified defendant's name, the preponderance of the
evidence demonstrates that the instant warrants check would have been performed with or
without physical retention of defendant's identification (R. 88:16, 22, 27). See State v.
Navanick, 1999 UT App. 265ffl[2-3,987 P.2d 1276 (police performed warrants check
based on witness report of defendant's name).
Significantly, Ray does not preclude application of the inevitable discovery rule on
these facts. Indeed, Ray is distinguishable on the ground that evidence seized there would
not otherwise have inevitably been discovered because Ray's consent to search was
obtained during the illegal detention in that case. Id. at ^[20, n.9. See, e.g., State v.
Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289 (Utah 1995) (consent to search obtained during course of an
9
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unjustified roadblock stop held to be insufficiently attenuated from the illegal stop).
Defendant's reliance on State v. Johnson,805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991) and State v. Hansen,
837 P.2d 987 (Utah App. 1992), is similarly distinguishable from the initial voluntary
encounter in this case. This is because both cases involve traffic-stop scenarios;
therefore, the police-citizen encounters necessarily began as level two detentions
requiring Fourth Amendment justification from their inception. Johnson, 805 P.2d at
764; Hansen, 837 P.2d at 989. Thus, similar to the request for consent to search in Ray,
the request for identification in these cases was made during an illegal detention. Ibid.
In contrast to traffic-stop cases, and as conceded by defendant, the police-citizen
encounter here began as a voluntary level one encounter and continued as such until
police retained defendant's identification, instead of returning it to her before running the
warrants check (R. 98:3), add. A. Aplt. Br. at 8. This means that no information
necessary to performing the warrants check was obtained during the course of the illegal
detention in this case. Thus, the instant warrants check was not at all dependent upon the
illegal detention for its successful completion-It would have been conducted with or
without the detention, and with or without physical retention of defendant's identification
(R. 88:16,22,28). It was therefore inevitable that police would discover defendant's
outstanding warrants and that she would be arrested thereon. Any contraband seized
during the search incident-to-arrest on the outstanding warrants is accordingly admissible.
Jackson, 805 P.2d at 769.
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CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the trial court's erroneous ruling that no detention occurred when
the police retained defendant's identification, the denial of the motion to suppress should
be affirmed. The inevitable discovery rule applies here because defendant's outstanding
warrants would have inevitably been discovered during the routine and predictable
warrants check, with or without retaining defendant's identification.3 Therefore,
contraband seized during the search of defendant's person incident to her arrest on the
outstanding warrants was properly admitted.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on ]S_ May 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

RIAN DECKER
ssistant Attorney General

3

To the extent that there is any question on this record as to the applicability of the
inevitable discovery rule, the proper remedy is remand to allow the trial court to make
that fact sensitive determination in the first instance.
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PROCEEDINGS

MR. DELLAPIANA:

I think she

pronounces it Topanotes.
THE COURT:

Topanotes

Thank you

probably won't get it right anyway; but Topanotes.
And :! t s 98 J "9208 5 3

991 91 99 3 92 .

In the latter

case, she's charged with a Class B misdemeanor of
mischievous conduct, I've never seer
Mischievous conduct?
categorizes it?

couched ill"

Is that how the City

I would have thought it would be

disorderly, or...
In any event, and the other one is illegal
possession of a controlled substance, a third-degree.
The defei idai it I :ias jc I:i led i is

Good morning, M s .

Topanotes•
MS. TOPANOTES:
THE COUR'J •

Good m o r n i n g .

Aikl 1 Ill note f o r t h e

record that Mr. Dellapiana is here on her behalf. The
State is represented.
And I've

an opportunity to consider by way

of what has been submitted by way of written product on
the motion to suppress and "iiri prepared
also have taken into account and carefully
2
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considered the case law as well as the testimony that was
adduced at our last hearing.
Counsel, I'm happy to hear from you and when I
say I'm ready to rule, that does not mean that I'm not
listening with an open mind to what both sides have to
say.
MR. DELLAPIANA:

The only thing I

would ask is if you did get a copy of the reply brief
that the State submitted?
THE COURT:

Yes, I did, and did not

even start to do my reading until I had that so I had the
full context before me.
MR. DELLAPIANA:

Judge, I have

nothing to add, we'd just submit it.
THE COURT:
MR. KOURIS:

Counsel?
The State would submit

it as well, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.

I will

indicate that in this matter, I think it was an
appropriate motion for the defense to bring to clarify
the law; however, I'm going to deny the motion on the
following basis:
I find that the stop at issue was a Level One
stop. The distinction between the Level Two Terry stop—
or excuse me—the--the distinction between the Level One

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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stop and the more serious Level Two stop obviously is
predicated upon articulable suspicion t o justify the
stop.

In th

point, because I think this stops short of a Level Two
stop.
I'll,*1 In .". If! i Hi.i,i 1 I'll!I w h e t h e r o n e i s In a n '

automobile o r o n foot, the police have the right t o stop
someone in a Level One manner, for a short,
ion-type search; merely t o ask the person who
they are

Fills is permissible, a s long as it is a purely

consensual, short-term encounter ai id bhat ther e i s :i 10
seizure, that is t o say, arrest or detention beyond the
person's will.
The

appeals tu

iepemil upon whether

there is any kind of actual arrest o r any kind of
physical force o r authority exerted or whether the other
person b e l i e v e I111111: JJ tiei freedom of movement i s

restrained.

But the standard, and this is clear under

State v s . Rameriz f is clearly an objective standa d and
it's dependent o n whether the defendant remained
cooperatively o r because she believed she was not free t o
leave.
In this case, based upon all the testimony
adduced, this Court finds that there was absolutely n o
testimony that she WAS 1 ./uiH^e 1 led 111 1 rni.i 111 Lul rather,
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that she remained cooperatively, because the police did
not in any way restrict her freedom to leave nor did she
voice any objection.
The Court also takes into account in making
this assessment of whether there was a show of authority
of a compelling nature, or physical force, the demeanor
of the police officer witnesses and the tone of their
voices, recognizing that it might have been different on
the occasion when they met with the defendant, the Court
nonetheless notes that while some police officers have
particularly compelling physical presence by virtue of
stature or the tone of their voice or the depth of their
voice or the manner in which they speak being
particularly dramatic, the officers in question did not
manifest any of this.
On the contrary, they both appear to be quite
soft-spoken, gentlemanly, professional individuals, not
particularly intimidating by virtue—or not intimidating
by virtue of demeanor voice or size, from what the Court
could observe and there is nothing before me to indicate
otherwise.
It appears clear further from the facts that
Officer Hansen asked her for identification, that she
voluntarily presented the same.
Further, the Court finds that while there were

5
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thr ee officers lii i i the general vicinity when M s . Topanotes
was stopped, t o characterize this a s three officers
surrounding h e r appears t o b e tailed b y IMIhie factus.
While it's a very good argument and if it h a d
been supported b y t h e facts, it night b e more compelling
t fi III «!• 'ouft

"Idi iri. i i I I null-. I h u t I In- t e s t i m o n y ,

asI

recall, w a s that three never did surround her, that there
were three in t h e general vicinity b u t only o n e directly

the third, quite some distance away.

A n d that there w a s

no attempt t o surround h e r o r give h e r t h e impress

r

Iiberty h a d been restricted.
Further, t h e Court notes that under State v s .
VMilialaiia# t h e appellate case

atate v s .

Hansen, t h e Court feels that this ruling is appropriate. *
Although if is n o t a n automobile-type seizure and o f
inci>&t" ID" 1 tlhie ii"iisi 3 l a w iioes i o thai

I1, tie Court

feels that t h e basic underlying rationale in all of t h e
cases that look at Level O n e and Level T w o stops, needs
to ]lb e c oi isi der ed :I i m this case a s we]
The Court h a s also considered State v . Jackson r
the appellate case from 1990, which had wonderful
language ::i ini ii t that I will'repeat, which I believe is
helpful in making t h e assessment.
That case?111

.;• Il h;ii;je Jfifl

is i a I; ed ( q u o t e ,

6
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lf

A

request for identification cannot constitute a show of
authority sufficient to convert an innocent encounter
into a seizure.

Only when police have in some way

restrained the liberty of an individual, either by force
or a show of authority, is there a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
Now, while the officers or officer at one point
had her identification, there was no testimony to suggest
that if she had asked for it to be returned to her or
said that wanted to leave, that anyone would have stopped
her; in fact, my recollection is the officers indicated
clearly she was not under arrest and her liberty had not
been curtailed.
In making this determination, this Court has
considered what courts before me have considered:

the

time of the day or night of the encounter; where the
encounter occurred, in this case, the fact that the
defendant was already outside of her home, was walking
toward her home, that the encounter did not even involve
taking her off the path she was on or to a different
locale, they let her remain in the same manner, which as
I understand it, was close to her home, a comfort zone.
There appears to be no isolation involved and
there appears, from the testimony, to be no indication of
a confrontational encounter.
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Further, the testimony and I cannot with
specificity point to the exact time, but I believe an
officer said five iiirli iinil cs mi IliPiiih wui the time cut hei
actual stay with t h e police officers while they did h e r
identification check, or the warrants check on t h e
identi ficat ion provided
Again, there h a s been no testimony supportive
of a weapon exhibited or used by the police, n o testimony
of

any touching ol liei

i in \w\\ wa | i;«n make h e r f e e l

intimidated or stop h e r from moving forward in a physical
manner, n o angry voices, inappropriate language or rough
tone has been attested t o ; on the contrary, the Court has
made the observations already noted.
She :i s br i ef ] y ! juesti oi led
against h e r will

:1 i it. no w ay deta I i led

The Court can find nothing to suggest

a confrontational aspect of this encounter*

The mere

presence of tilie poll MI/T nif f icer and l.hei!; r e q u e s t officers and their request for identification is not
sufficient t o escalate this t o a Level T w o Terry stop.
Over all, there w a s n o evidence that the
defendant raised any objection, either b y h e r demeanor o r
any kind of non-verbal display or verbally t o the
provision of h e r identification or the warrants check.
And for these reasons, t h e Court denies t h e
moti on to suppress.
8
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I have gone into some detail because I'm
assuming that this may be an issue on appeal and I'm
going to ask the State, Mr. Kouris, if you would, to
prepare findings as well as an order denying the motion.
MR. KOURIS:

I will, your Honor.

THE COURT: And if you wish to look
at the tape, if I went to fast or to follow up with any
questions, you're welcome to.
Did I —
MR. KOURIS:
THE COURT:

Thank you.
—manage to articulate it

clearly enough?
MR. KOURIS:
THE COURT:
MR. KOURIS:
THE COURT:

I think you did.
All right.
Thank you.
That brings us, I

suppose, to the next step and Ms. Topanotes, no judge
who's honest would ever tell you that they're absolutely
sure that rulings that they make is correct.

What one is

owed in a court of law is not a lack of error because
judges are human beings, we do our best, but fairness.
And so I have fairly considered the law and this was my
determination as to what the law is.

I may be wrong and

I would hope I'm not, but if I am, you certainly have the
right to appeal this and I'm sure Mr. Dellapiana has
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On Certiorari to the Utah Cou r t of Appeals

DVRRANT, Jnyt;isa:
51
The State petitioned for review of a court of appeals'
decision reversing the trial court's denial of Douglas B. James's
motion to suppress evidence. After the trial court denied
James's motion to suppress/ he was convicted of driving under the
influence of alcohol. On appeal, the court of appeals held that
a police officer violated James's Fourth Amendment rights when he
opened the door of James's truck, while James was seated inside
the truck, for the purpose of investigating a citizen's report of
reckless driving. 2£& State v, James, 1999 OT App. 17, M l l - 1 4 ,
977 P.2d 489. The court of appeals also held that the inevitable
discovery doctrine was inapplicable. See id. at 1115-23. We
granted certiorari, see S^ate v. James, 984 P.2d 1023 (Utah
1999), and now reverse the court of appeals.
BACKGROUND
32
On March 16, 1996, a citizen approached Utah Highway
Patrol Trooper Jason Kendrick and reported that he had just seen
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a reckless driver. The citizen stated that a dark-colored pickup
truck was "all over the road" and had "hit or . . . almost
struck'' three other vehicles. The citizen was able to provide
Kendrick with the truck's license number, approximate location,
and direction of travel. Kendrick contacted highway patrol
dispatch and confirmed that the license number matched the
vehicle description provided by the citizen. Kendrick obtained
the registered address of the truck's owner and drove to that
address. As he neared the residence, he saw a truck matching the
citizen's and dispatcher's description enter the driveway, where
it stopped and remained with its brake lights on. Kendrick
pulled up behind the truck with his headlights on, left his
patrol car, and approached the truck's driver's-side door.
During the time it took Kendrick to stop and approach, no one
attempted to leave the truck.
$3
Kendrick looked in the window and saw two persons,
James, who was in the driver's seat, and a female in the
passenger seat.1 Kendrick opened the door and asked the driver,
James, to get out of the truck. Once the door was open, Kendrick
saw a 12-pack of beer on the passenger-side floor of the cab,
with one can opened. Kendrick and James walked to the front of
the truck, where Kendrick asked to see James's driver's license.
James dropped his license when he pulled it from his wallet.
Kendrick noted that James smelled strongly of alcohol, his face
was flaccid, his speech slurred, and his eyes were droopy and
bloodshot. Kendrick also observed that James "appeared to be
unstable, unable to stand straight" without keeping his feet
apart or moving. Kendrick expressed concern about the
possibility that James had been involved in an accident.
Kendrick and James walked around the truck and scanned it for
signs of damage, but found none.
514
At about this time, the female passenger left the
vehicle and "was very upset . . . yelling, screaming, that kind
of thing." Kendrick became concerned for his safety, told James
to remain where he was and returned to his patrol car to call for
backup. James instead went inside his home. When the backup
officer, Trooper Arlow Hancock, arrived, he and Kendrick entered
the attached garage through the open garage door. They knocked
on the door leading from the garage into the house and told James
that if he did not come out they would come in to get him. James
came out and performed a standard field sobriety test, which he
x

At the suppression hearing, Kendrick indicated that he
had some concerns for his safety due to the high profile of the
truck, which prevented him from observing what was taking place
in the cab of the truck below his line of vision.
No. 990267
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failed. When James attempted to walk away again, the officers
arrested him. James was taken to the Cache County jail/ where he
refused to take any further sobriety tests or a breathalyzer
test. The State charged James with driving under the influence
and having an open container of alcohol in his vehicle.
55
At trial, James moved to suppress evidence of his
intoxicated condition. He asserted three Fourth Amendment
grounds for suppression: (1) Kendrick initially lacked reasonable
suspicion to stop his truck or detain him; (2) Kendrick opened
the door to his truck without probable cause; and (3) Kendrick
and Hancock lacked the probable cause and exigent circumstances
necessary to enter his garage without a warrant* The trial court
denied James's motions. A jury convicted James of driving under
the influence, but acquitted him on the open container charge.
SIC On appeal, the court of appeals addressed only the
argument relating to Kendrick's opening of the truck door. The
court of appeals ruled that the officer's opening of the vehicle
door constituted a search of the vehicle rather than an
investigative detention and that the search was illegal. See
James, 1999 UT App. 17, M12-14, 977 P.2d at 491-92. It then
discussed the "inevitable discovery'' exception to the warrant
requirement and concluded that the exception was inapplicable.

Saa isL at 1115-22.
57
We granted the State's petition for certiorari. On
certiorari review, the State argues that the court of appeals
construed cases prohibiting police from opening a vehicle door in
certain circumstances too broadly and out of context.
Specifically, the State contends that where an officer has the
right to order a person to temporarily leave a vehicle, the
officer's mere opening of a vehicle door cannot constitute an
illegal search.
The State also argues that the court of appeals
erred in its application of the inevitable discovery doctrine.
ANALYSIS
58
"On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of
appeals, not the decision of the trial court." State v. Harmon,
910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). M'We review the court of
appeals' decision for correctness and give its conclusions of law
no deference.' "• CarEitor y, Ptg-Tsch RMtqgflUon; 944 P.2d 346,
350 (Utah 1997) (quoting Newspaper Acrencv Corp. v. Auditing Div,,
938 P.2d 266, 267 (Utah 1997)).
19
We begin our analysis with a brief statement of two
fundamental and related tenets of Fourth Amendment caselaw.
First, the presumptive rule relating to reasonable searches and
3
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seizures is that searches may not be conducted without a warrant
supported by probable cause. See Katz v. Ijnited States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967). .There are a number of "exceptions" to the
presumptive rule, however. See id. The application of those
exceptions is guided by the second tenet, which is that the
fundamental right protected by the Fourth Amendment is a person's
reasonable expectation of privacy. Se,3 United States v.
Jacobsen. 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
110 Due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highlyregulated status, persons traveling in vehicles have a lesser
expectation of privacy than they would have within a private
dwelling. See California v. Carnev. 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985);
gpUtft PafcQtfl Vi Ppperiqan, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976); see also
CfldY Yt PpmfrgpwgHl/ 413 U.S. 433, 442 (1973); Chambers v.
tterenSY/ 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970); Cooper v. California. 386 U.S.
58, 59 (1967). The so-called "automobile exception" to the
warrant rule applies regardless of whether the vehicle is
actually in motion at the time. Seq Carney. 471 U.S. at 391.
Under this exception to the warrant rule, officers may
temporarily detain a vehicle and its occupants upon reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity for the purpose of conducting a
limited investigation of the suspicion.2 Whren v. United States.
517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659,
663 (1979). Reasonable suspicion may be based on information
provided by a citizen if that information, coupled with available
corroboration, is sufficiently reliable under the totality of the
circumstances. See Alabama v. White. 496 U.S. 325, 330-32
(1990) . Cwing to inherent safety concerns and the limited nature
of the intrusion, officers may order the occupants of a vehicle
to leave the vehicle during the course of the investigation. See
t*aryJi3nd V« VMsen* 519 U.S. 408, 412-15 (1997); Pennsylvania v.
mmSi,
434 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1977).3

2

The detention "must be temporary and last no longer than
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Florida v.
Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
3

James asserts that the State has raised concerns relating
to officer safety for the first time on appeal. This argument is
misplaced. It is clear that the safety concerns guiding the
Supreme Court's decision in Mimms do not depend on any particular
showing that an officer was at heightened risk due to the unique
circumstances of a given automobile stop, see, e.g.. Knowles v,
Iowa. 525 U.S. 113, 117-18 (1998) (noting greater risks
accompanying arrest of vehicle's occupants, which justify
protective search of vehicle to ensure no weapons are present),
(Continued on next page.)
No. 990267
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511 The specific issue on certiorari in this case concerns
the Fourth Amendment propriety of opening the driver's-side door
of James's truck for the purpose of speaking to James and
requesting that he step out of the vehicle. As a preliminary
matter, we note that the facts of the case definitively
demonstrate that Kendrick's detention of James was based on more
than adequate reasonable suspicion.4 Kendrick's investigation
was founded on a citizen's detailed report of a reckless driving
pattern that was consistent with driving under the influence.
The citizen's identification of the license plate and description
of the truck were corroborated in all material respects by the
highway patrol dispatch office, and, subsequently, by Kendrick's
own observation. Kendrick also viewed James's pickup pulling
into the driveway at the registered address. Thus, under the
totality of the circumstances, Kendrick had the right and the
authority to temporarily detain James and investigate the report
of reckless driving,5 It follows that Kendrick was legally
authorized to order James to step from the cab of his truck.6
£fi£ Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110-11; State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132,

3

(Footnote continued.)
but rather are of an inherent and general nature. See Mimms. 4 34
U.S. at 108-10 (officer required defendant to step out of vehicle
as a routine precautionary measure). Hence, the "issue" of
officer safety is not a distinct argument, subject to waiver
analysis. It is instead an inherent aspect of the governing
caselaw, which we are not at liberty to disregard.
4

Although the court of appeals did not address this issue
at any length, we must necessarily dispose of it to reach the
question presented on certiorari.
5

In Kavsvllle Cltv v.' Mulcahv, 943 P.2d 231, 235-36 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997), the court of appeals noted that the inherent
reliability of information volunteered by a citizen will usually
be much greater than that provided by an anonymous tip or by a
paid informant. As such, the necessity of corroborating
observation or information is correspondingly reduced for
purposes of the totality of the circumstances analysis. Id.
6

The court of appeals noted that the evidence was not
entirely clear on the question of whether Kendrick did or did not
tap on the driver's window before opening the door. 5ee James.
1999 UT App. 17, *3, 977 P.2d 489. The trial court, in its order
denying James's motion to suppress, made no specific finding
regarding this question, and we likewise consider it immaterial
to decision of the case on certiorari.

5
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1135 (Utah 1989}. He needed neither consent nor a warrant to
make this request,
fl2 The court of appeals' analysis overlooks the
fundamental distinction between detention and questioning of
James himself (a procedure specifically authorized by Mimms) and
a search for physical items of evidence not in plain view, such
as narcotics or firearms. In this regard, we note that the issue
of Kendrick's discovery of the open container is not before us,
nor was it an issue before the court of appeals. Kendrick was
acquitted on the open container charge.
$13 James's defense of the court of appeals' decision
further assumes that there is a functional distinction between
Kendrick's opening the door himself and his requiring James to
open it. The court of appeals cited State v. Laroccq. wherein
this court established, by plurality decision, a rule prohibiting
warrantless searches of vehicles in the absence of probable cause
and exigent circumstances. See 794 P.2d 460, 469-71 (1990)
(Durham, J., joined by Zimmerman, J.) (prohibiting opening of
vehicle door to examine vehicle identification number); id. at
473 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result); see also Stafre v.
Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229, 1236-37 (Russon, J., joined by Howe, J.)
(reciting and applying Larocco rule to search of vehicle for
contraband); isL, at 1239 (Zimmerman, C.J., concurring in the
result); id. at 1239-41 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result);
id. at 1241-42 (Durham, J., concurring and dissenting);
Schlosser. 774 P.2d at 1135-36 (holding that opening of vehicle
door to search for contraband violated Fourth Amendment).
However, all of these cases are inapposite; they addressed the
opening of doors or searches of vehicles to search for physical
evidence, as opposed to lawful detention and questioning of
individuals. In this case, Kendrick was investigating James
himself, and was not searching James's vehicle. Causing the door
to be opened in some manner was a reasonable and practical means
for obtaining compliance with Kendrick's authority to lawfully
require James to step from the vehicle. As such, the opening of
the door was an incidental factor in the investigation of James's
impaired physical condition, and not an independent search of the
vehicle. To draw distinctions as.to who actually opened the door
and the nature of any conversation or notification occurring
beforehand would elevate form over substance. We therefore
overrule the court of appeals' holding that Kendrick's opening of
James's door, in the context of a lawful investigation into the
reasons for James's reckless driving, constituted a violation of
the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches.
$14 Although our resolution of this issue renders
immaterial the court of appeals' conclusion that the inevitable
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discovery exception was inapplicable, the State has expressed
concern that the court of appeals' holding on that issue will
establish incorrect precedent. We therefore briefly address this
issue. The inevitable discovery "exception" has been described
as an exception to the exclusionary rule, which dictates that
evidence obtained by virtue of illegal police activity must be
suppressed at trial. The exception provides that evidence that
would have been obtained regardless of illegal police activity
will not be suppressed because to do so would violate the
underlying policy of the exclusionary rule—which is to place the
police in a position that is neither better nor worse than it
would have been absent the illegal activity. See Mix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44 (1984).
115 The court of appeals held that the inevitable discovery
exception can be satisfied only by an "entirely independent,
alternate, intervening, appreciably attenuated investigation
aside from the tainted investigation." jlamfia, 1999 UT App, 17,
521, 977 P.2d at 493. The State maintains that these criteria
are not required by the inevitable discovery exception, but are
instead merely descriptive of a subcategory of cases falling
within the "independent source doctrine/' The State concedes
that the independent source doctrine describes one method of
satisfying the inevitable discovery exception, which is to
demonstrate that the same evidence uncovered by illegal police
activity would have been obtained by an entirely independent,
prior investigation. Nevertheless, the State argues that the
independent source doctrine is not coextensive with the
inevitable discovery exception.
116 We agree. In Nix, the United States Supreme Court
described the distinction between the specific requirements of
the independent source doctrine and the broader dictates of the
policy underlying the inevitable discovery exception. See Nix,
467 U.S. at 443-44. The Supreme Court noted that the fundamental
policy advanced by the inevitable discovery exception was the
same as that of the independent source doctrine.
The independent source doctrine teaches us
that the interest of society in deterring
unlawful police conduct and the public
interest in having juries receive all
probative evidence of a crime are properly
balanced by putting the police in the same,
not a HQJLflLS., position tha[n] they would have
been in if no police error or misconduct had
occurred.
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Id, at 443. Because this policy, rather than the specific nature
of the investigation or investigations determines whether the
exclusionary rule, requires suppression of evidence, the Supreme
Court concluded that the appropriate standard governing the
inevitable discovery exception is whether "the prosecution can
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information
ultimately would have been discovered by lawful means." Id. at
444. This is the standard that must be met to avoid suppression
and it does not necessarily include the elements dictated by the
court of appeals. To the extent it is appropriate to elaborate
upon or elucidate the Nix standard/ by adopting more specific
requirementsf we may do so in a future appropriate case. It is
therefore sufficient for our purpose here to hold that the
requirements adopted by the court of appeals do not correctly set
forth the inevitable discovery standard.
117 in conclusion/ we note that our decision of the issues
presented on certiorari does not completely resolve this case.
Before the court of appeals# James presented a third distinct
ground for suppression of at least a portion of the evidence of
his intoxication. Specifically/ he argued that Kendrick and
Hancock lacked the probable cause and exigent circumstances
necessary to enter his garage without a warrant and arrest him.
Because the court of appeals did not address this argument/ see
Reese v. Reese. 1999 UT 75, 19, 984 P.2d 987, we remand to the
court of appeals for appropriate treatment.7

118 Chief Justice Howef Associate Chief Justice Russon,
Justice Durham, and Justice Wilkins concur in Justice Durrant's
opinion.

7

In some circumstances, we have been willing to treat
issues not addressed by the court of appeals for purposes of
judicial economy. See, e.gty State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 861
(Utah 1995). Even were we inclined to address this issue, it has
not been briefed or argued by either party on certiorari.
No. 990267
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